Brian 巳OCKING THE PRO巳しEM OF METHODOLOGY The study conference of the In te rn a tio n a l Association fo r the H istory o f Religions which met in Turku in 1973 to dis cuss the top ic of "M ethodology of the Science of R e lig io n "1 brought together a number o f distinguished scholars from the Western w orld to debate issues re la tin g to studies of religions from a ll parts of the w orld. The con ference was considered necessary because Religious Studies was going through something o f a m ethodological crisis.
Since this crisis was brought about la rgely by an a ccel erated a pp reciation o f the facts of c u ltu ra l re la tiv is m ，one m ight have expected a fa r w ider and more even spread o f national and c u ltu ra l backgrounds amongst the participa n ts. W hatever the reasons fo r the re s tric tio n of the conference to Western p a rtic ip a n ts ， 2 the re s tric tio n was there, and should be noted. It may w e ll be, as Werblowsky argued, th a t c u ltu ra l background makes no sig n ifica n t d iffe re n ce to one' s a b ility to p ra ctice what is called the "Science of R e lig io n ," fo r the s c ie n tific method should be the same wherever it is practiced (W erblowsky 1960) . The issue at stake at Turku, however, was not the p ra ctice of the ology of th a t science. And the problem o f methodology has been, as Sharpe observed, "w ide open" since the atmosphere o f evolutionism which tem porarily united disciplines as dis parate as anthropology, history and com parative religion T h e o r ig in a l v e rs io n o f th is p a p e r w as p re s e n te d a t th e a n n u a l m e e tin g o f th e I n s t it u t e o f P h ilo s o p h y , U n iv e r s ity o f T s u k u b a (T s u k u b a D a ig a k u T e s tug a k u S his5 G a k k a i) as a c o n t r ib u t io n to th e " P r o je c t on B u d d h ism and C h r i s t i a n i t y " o f t h a t I n s t it u t e , M a rc h 1982. F o r m y d e f in it io n o f " W e s te r n " see th e l i s t o f p a r tic ip a n ts in H onko 1979, p p . x i -x i i i .
began to dissolve at the beginning o f this century (Sharpe 1975，p. 68) . While the problem o f methodology remains w ith us, its solution seems to become more，ra th e r than less, remote w ith the passage o f tim e. None o f the disciplines outside Religious Studies seems able to deal adequately w ith r e li gion (fo r the object o f sociological study is society, not re lig io n , the object o f history is history and not religion, and so on). The most persuasive plea (persuasive p a rtly because it re fle c ts the status quo) is fo r a d ive rsity of methods and approaches, but the very fa c t th a t such a d iv e rs ity needs to be argued fo r (and is not by any means acceptable as a meta-methodology) indicates some inherent in s ta b ility . A methodology consisting o f many methodologies sounds lik e no methodology at a ll. Such a state o f a ffa irs is unsatisfying, as the Turku conference agreed. It may also be in e vitab le , as Honko suggested in his review o f the con ference (Honko 1979, pp. x 
x v iii-ix ).
Strange loops and the ^re fle xive e ffe c t." P art o f the reason fo r the p ro life ra tio n o f methodologies has been th a t the objects o f study o f the science o f religion increasingly are acquiring the capacity to answer back. The more our a tte n tion is concentrated on "liv in g " religions, and the more fa m ilia r spokesmen fo r such liv in g religions become w ith the categories and concepts of the science o f re lig io n , the more complex the p icture becomes. This is a consideration which is d ire c tly relevant to studies o f (and sometimes funded by) large and sophisticated modern religious move ments such as the U n ifica tio n Church and Soka Gakkai (to take the tw o perhaps most obvious examples) but it is also, and in prin cip le no d iffe re n tly , relevant to studies o f tra d i tions as long-standing, complex and highly a rtic u la te as are mainstream Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity .
If we add the fu rth e r com plication tha t many scholars o f re lig io n also belong to the tra d itio n s which they are studying or comparing, and fre q u e n tly act as spokesmen fo r these tra d itio n s (as though a cat one was vivise ctin g s ta rt-ed to discuss the ethics of the o peration),3 then in tryin g to establish a workable methodology fo r the s c ie n tific study of re lig io n we find ourselves in what H ofstadter calls a "strange loop" -th a t is, a complex semantic and epistemolo g ica l process which somehow always returns to the point from which it started, though in a subtly transform ed way (H ofstadter 1980, pp. 10-24) . This is also one meaning o f the "herm eneutical c irc le ."
The exploration o f such strange loops, perhaps involving several sets of religious scriptures, a range o f wisdom tra d itio n s and a pyramid o f herm eneuti cal devices, can acquire a religious tinge in its e lf.
F in a l p atte rn s. In the course of the Turku conference it became clear th a t some approaches were not considered h elpful by most of the p a rticip a n ts. "A the ological element occurred in various co ntexts," reports Honko, "but never at any stage succeeded in gaining co n tro l of the discussion1 ' (Honko 1979, p. x x iii) . No a lte rn a tive method predominated, however, and though the conference as a whole seemed to fa v o r "s o ft" methodologies over "hard" ones, this p re fe r ence was uneasy, even defensive (Honko 1979, p. x x v iii) .
In the course of the discussions E ric Sharpe raised a po ssib ility which also led nowhere at the tim e, th a t there m ight be no underlying ra tioj no fin a l p a tte rn to be discovered by any m ethodological procedure. This was ch a ra cte r ised by Werblowsky as the kind o f question asked by young er scholars and students一it m ight be thought naive, but should be taken seriously (Honko 1979, pp. 209-210, p. 216) .
R a tio n a lity and re lig io n . The tendency of younger scholars and students is to become older scholars and students and so, eight years a fte r Turku the question o f w hether religion has an underlying r s tio or p a tte rn is s till seriously asked. The question is im portant because ra tio n a lity is seen as the 3.
N in ia n S m a rt c a lls th is p h e n o m e n o n " th e r e f le x iv e e f f e c t " (S m a rt 1973, p p . 一 6 ， ^0 -^1 .
B rian BOCKING key to a s c ie n tific approach. Since, in the West at least, the independence o f science was o fte n hard-won, and emerged from w ith in a re s tric tiv e theological or religious fram ew ork, ra tio n a lity and re lig io n have o fte n been viewed as opposites, and a successful analysis o f religious action is o fte n lik e ly to be one which exposes the nature o f religious b e lie f or p ra c tic e as fundam entally illusory or irra tio n a l. This has been a constant problem fo r phenomenology, which in seeking to preserve the sphere o f the religious (in the sense of the b e lie ve r!s own understanding o f the signi fica nce o f his religious actions and beliefs) has often found its e lf defending the irra tio n a l-in other words it has been unable to penetrate beneath the surface o f religous claims and counter-claim s.
Consequently a phenomenological account o f religious behavior often seems less convincing (because it has less explanatory power) than, say, a socio lo g ic a l explanation* A sociological explanation, however, is lik e ly to take as its premise -im p lic itly or e x p lic itly -the view th a t religious ways of thinking are less ra tio n a l, and th e re fo re less tru th -re v e a lin g , than its own.4 M u ltip le la y e rs o f meaning. Two helpful points can be made here, I th in k , to help heal the r i f t between science and re lig io n . The fir s t is th a t scientists are less complacent about the s tra ig h tfo rw a rd ra tio n a lity o f th e ir own premises than they used to be, fo r as the psychologist Charles Tart has shown, s c ie n tific statem ents about the u ltim a te nature of things can be lite ra lly indistinguishable from religious statem ents (T a rt 1975, p. 111) .
The second is th a t one o f the weaknesses of the phenomenological approach, which might be characterized as its excessive politeness in the face o f absurd or unlikely tru th -c la im s , can be dispensed w ith reasonably easily な . F o r an illu m in a t in g d e b a te on th e s e issues see th e c o lle c t io n o f p a p e rs by B ry a n W ils o n a n d o th e r s in th e re c e n t issu e o f th is jo u r n a l, Ja p a n e se Jo u rn a l o f R elig io u s S tu d ies 9 / 1 (J 9 8 2 ). through the recognition th a t religious systems are endem ically se cta rian， th a t d o ctrin a l standpoints emerge in response to other d o ctrin a l standpoints, and th a t p ra c tic a l ly every religious tra d itio n or sect has emerged into public knowledge w ith in a co nte xt o f competing views o f the w orld and competing value-systems. This means, fo r instance, a fo llo w e r o f Tenrikyo may believe th a t the center o f the universe lies in the village o f Shoyashiki in Yamato, but this "b e lie f" should not be understood from the point o f view o f the science o f religion as a complete account o f the contents o f the consciousness o f th a t fo l low er, fo r the b e lie f also implies the re fu ta tio n , or a n tic i pation, o f a lte rn a tiv e views o f which the believer is undoubtedly aware.
The T enrikyo devotee Is to a greater or lesser extent aware th a t other people do not regard ShSyashiki as the center o f the universe, and he w ill have a view about the status o f this a lte rn a tiv e b e lie f or opinion. He may fo r instance think th a t people who do not re a lize th a t Shoyashiki is the center o f the universe are misguided, or unlucky, or obtuse. The essential point is tha t the believer is aware o f a lterna tive s, and to this extent his religious b e lie f can never be considered as a naive m anifestation o f a single perspective.
The awareness o f a lterna tive s is an especially impor ta n t fa c to r in any account o f the religious standpoint of Buddhist or C h ristia n communities, where believers are often a cutely aware o f sectarian, ideological and individual a lte rn a tive s to th e ir own beliefs. This is also a ch a ra cte ris tic of p rim itiv e societies' religions, as Mary Douglas showed in quoting Vansina's account o f three independent thinkers among the Bushong who maintained complex per sonal beliefs but nevertheless took th e ir fu ll p a rt in the religious "system" o f the trib e , despite apparent inconstan cies (Douglas 1966, pp. 78-79) .
M oreover, this has a bearing on how we view s e c ta ri anism, fo r the fa c t o f sectarianism w ith in what is norma tiv e ly conceived o f as a single religious tra d itio n (C h ris tia n ity and Buddhism both provide excellen t examples o f a weak unity o f strong diversities) which modern ecum enically-m inded theologians and Buddhologians tend to re g re t, and which a n ti-re lig io u s theorists sieze on as e vi dence o f the inchoate and irra tio n a l nature o f religious thought, is a c tu a lly to be seen as a rich source of m ultiple meanings, and an illu s tra tio n o f the way in which human thought functions at m ultiple levels o f awareness, fo r the science o f religion.
As an example which also happens to involve a 巳u d d h ist-C h ristia n comparison, Leon H urvitz once comment ed th a t the average Chinese Buddhist's view o f the Lotus Sutra (which is an Indian w ork translated in to Chinese) resembled th a t o f the m iddle-Am erican fundam entalist, who knows the Bible was not o rig in a lly w ritte n in English, but the fa c t has not penetrated his consciousness. In the same way, a ll kinds o f religious beliefs to some exte n t conceal or imply th e ir opposites and a lte rn a tive s, and no one involved in a religious system is to ta lly unaware o f this aspect. Religious teachings are no doubt cre a tive , but they are not cre a tive ex nihRo, In p ra ctice, this means tha t a phenomenological approach to, say, Japanese C atholicism should include also a ll the P ro te sta nt, Buddhist, Shinto other religious and non-religious criticism s and counter views o f which Japanese C a tholics are aware and in the c o nte xt o f which they define th e ir own religious stand p o in ts-no re lig io n is an island.
Engaging w ith a lte rn a tive s. It should also be noted in this connection that s c ie n tific standpoints have to be establish ed thoroughly in just the same way as religious standpoints in re la tio n to existing views which they may wish to over throw , and th a t this is another point of convergence fo r s c ie n tific and religious approaches.
As an illu s tra tio n , Sigmund Freud?s in te n tio n to establish psychoanalysis on a s c ie n tific basis necessarily led him into explanations of phenomena hardly related to therapy, such as the origins of m o ra lity and the history o f the Jewish people. In moving so fa r from the center o f what he intended to be essentially a c lin ic a l the rapeutic method he acknowledged the fa c t tha t every opinion, however w ell-suported it is, must also engage w ith a ll a lte rn a tive opinions and w o rld -views in order to be firm ly established.
In the same way, the m otive fo r the study o f compara tiv e religion in mainland (Zhina today lies in the recognized need fo r M a rx is t-しeninist ideology to be thorough -th a t is, fo r it to take account o f the re a litie s of all possible a lte r native ideologies (including religious ones) in order to become strong its e lf. In fa c t the desire to undermine a view d iffe re n t from one's own is one of the most compel ling m otives fo r studying th a t point o f view in a ll its ra m ifica tio n s, and is one o f the reasons missionaries often become the most assiduous students o f "o th e r" religions.
R elative perspectives* However, in try in g to establish a s c ie n tific perspective, one is eventually led into the area of c u ltu ra l re la tivism , as is increasingly seen nowadays in the Japanese case, where Western ideologies, psychologies and models of social and religious development which have been thoroughly tested only in re la tio n to Western mate rials often seem unable to come to grips w ith the Japanese data. This is not a subject which it is necessary to pursue in d eta il in the pages o f this journal. The ra tio n a lity o f the presuppositions o f much th a t is considered s c ie n tific in the West is being called increasingly into question， and we are now much more used to dealing w ith the idea th a t d iffe re n t individuals see the w orld d iffe re n tly , th a t patterns are dependent upon perspective, and th a t our perception o f the w orld is e xactly that -a perception.
Ideas lik e this have been available fo r a long tim e, but in the West at least we have confined them to philosophi cal speculation and we have not applied them w ith in the social sciences and the humanities so readily as in the physical sciences. It may be th a t cheap a ir tra ve l has help ed accustom us to thinking re la tiv e ly ; the experience o f passing rapidly from one tim e-zone to another fo r instance prevents us from ever again asking naively what "th e " time is.
Q uite apart from experiences o f this kind, a sense o f the essential a rbitrariness o f social and c u ltu ra l patterns is induced by the cum ulative process o f "answering back'* re fe rre d to above, whereby cu ltures and beliefs which fo r m erly existed as objects o f study have, through the agency o f able spokesmen -including com parative re lig io n ists -been able to challenge the presuppositions of the studying cu l ture. Even so, w hether one accepts the idea tha t meaning depends on perspective depends upon one's perspective.
巳UDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY
In what way do the general issues raised in this prelim inary discussion c o n trib u te to the p a rtic u la r topic o f com parative studies o f 巳uddhism and C h ristia n ity? F irs tly , the question o f who p a rticip a te s in ce rtain types o f discussion forces us to ask who takes part in com parative studies whose area o f inquiry extends to cover both Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity and at the same time is re s tric te d to cover only 巳uddhism and C h ris tia n ity .
The answer is tha t it is usually Buddhist or C hristian scholars who are interested in a fie ld o f study so definedby which is meant o f course scholars and students o f re lig io n whose background or a ffilia tio n is Buddhist or C h ristia n .
Blind spots in B uddhist-C hristian studies.
The modern encounter at a fa irly sophisticated level between Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity -"those two great shapers o f East and West" as Ninian Smart described them in his 1979-80 G iffo rd le c tu re s5 -is a m a tte r o f h is to ric a l fa c t.
The mutual d istru st o f 巳uddhism and C h ris tia n ity as te r rito ria lly competing religious tra d itio n s over the last few centuries (a d is tru s t in s tru c tiv e ly documented in the case o f Japan), and the impulsion fo r them to come to terms (th a t is, to syncretize) in the la tte r part of the tw e n tie th century as two religious tra d itio n s engaged in t e r a lia in te r rito ria l com petition w ith avowedly a ntireligiou s or nonreligious ideologies and philosophies such as Marxism, is also a mat te r of h is to ric a l fa ct.
Since 巳uddhism and C h ris tia n ity are both tra d itio n s w ith a consciously maintained, past and fu tu re oriented histo ric a lis t dimension, so both tra d itio n s have a strong in te r est in th e ir respective (or even jo in t) futures.
Hence spokesmen fo r both tra d itio n s, even in th e ir role as scho lars of re lig io n , tend n a tu ra lly enough to be resistant to analyses which p re d ict the demise o f e ith e r or both of these religions. Perhaps this resistance, m anifest as one voice of the secularization debate, is a shared blind-spot of 巳uddhism and C h ris tia n ity , but it is something fo r which we should also be g ra te fu l, fo r the essentially theological impulse which lies a t the heart of the tra d itio n a l phenom enological approach to the study of re lig io n has been responsible fo r preserving (and also re-presenting) the in te g rity of a "religiou s" dimension in respect of data clas sifie d as religious. Because there is life in re lig io n , we can investigate re lig io n in life .
The re lig io u s dimension. However, the very idea th a t cer tain aspects or elements of life are "re lig io u s" w hile others are not, which may have been useful as a co rre ctive at some times and in some circumstances, contains its own c o ntra d ictio ns and hence is lim ite d , because it rests on the assumption th a t the existence of a religious dimension is consensually denied from the point of view o f a tru ly scien t if ic perspective.
But from w ith in the Buddhist and C h ristia n tra d itio n s no d is tin c tio n is a ctu a lly made between what is religious and what is not, except in the very lim ited sense th a t cer ta in a c tiv itie s , buildings, scriptures and so fo rth demand a more re ve re n tia l a ttitu d e o f mind than is normal. For the C h ristia n , this is God's w orld, and everything is in that sense "re lig io u s ." For the Buddhist, a p arallel situ atio n obtains because everything is u ltim a te ly understood and experienced in Buddhist terms. This is an ideal p ictu re in the sense th a t it assumes greater consistency o f self-understanding than is normally found amongst the adherents o f e ithe r tra d itio n , but we can a t least say th a t insofar as someone conceives himself to be a C h ristia n or a Buddhist, this constitutes his u lt i mate frame of reference.
Insiders and outsiders. A t the same tim e, o f course, C hris tians and Buddhists do not believe th a t the generally sacred ch aracte r of the world makes non-G hristians or nonBuddhists into religious people. For both tra d itio n s it is im portant that one "becomes" a fo llo w e r. There may be sal vation outside the church, or nirvana to be obtained by plants and stones, but insofar as these possibilitie s ever become relevant to the p ra c tic a l situ atio n o f the church or sangha, the decisive element o f e ntry into the religious community, lay or monastic, by b irth or by in itia tio n , is always present. The prim ary d iffe re n ce between the two tra d itio n s here is one o f tim e-scale ra th e r than o f p rin ciple; Buddhists as a rule view life in terms o f,a series of births and deaths, C hristians in terms of one decisive lif e time only， so th a t m atters become correspondingly more urgent.
The outsider, the social scie n tist fo r instance, precisely does not share this C h ristia n or Buddhist view th a t a ll the world is a sacred place. T yp ica lly, he sees re lig io n in its e lf as only one aspect of a w orld which is in p rin cip le ame nable to explanation and in vestigation in terms other than religious ones. Consequently, one of the greatest problems fo r the student of re lig io n who wants to preserve the cate gory of the !,re lig io u s" -th a t is, who wants to say th a t the science of re lig io n deals w ith data which e ith e r are not or cannot be adequately understood by other academic or s c ie n tific disciplines such as history, aesthetics or socio biology (and who ty p ic a lly holds some religious b e lie f of his own)-has been the problem o f tra nslatin g religious per spectives into s c ie n tific a lly acceptable ones. This problem may be expressed in terms o f the Japanese d istin ction between uchi (insider) and soto (outsider) contexts, and means in essence tha t a theologian or Buddhologian can in p ra ctice le g itim a te ly say things as a priest which he cannot le g itim a te ly say as an academic.
But as P eter Berger pointed out some time ago in The Sacred Canopy, to make any d iffe re n tia tio n between these contexts is impossible except on the basis of some theolog ica l a p rio ri " … but I fo r one cannot get myself into a position from which I can launch theological a prioris, I am forced th e re fo re to abandon a d iffe re n tia tio n th a t is sense less from any a p o s te rio ri vantage p oint" (Berger 1967, pp. 185-187) . For Berger this means tha t, being unable as a responsible member of the academic community to present his beliefs as knowledge, he is forced to abandon the uchi/ soto d is tin c tio n and adm it th a t every presupposition, religious or not, is in p rinciple open to question.
Science and warmth. The problem, then, is to develop a tru ly s c ie n tific methodology fo r the study o f religion which transcends the uchl/soto d istin ctio n by explaining the data th a t does ju stice to the understanding of the believer, but is nonetheless ra tio n a l and s c ie n tific a lly acceptable. In the case of com parative studies of 巳uddhism and C h ris tia n ity we need to be working towards an understanding v/hich is s c ie n tific a lly based on the data presented by these two tra d itio n s , which goes beyond any narrow ly theological per spective (theological perspectives need not in principle be narrow but they usually are, as T illic h discovered when he came to Japan) and yet at the same time respects the understanding of the believer.
It is not p a rtic u la rly d iffic u lt to develop a methodology by which to understand Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity which is based on h is to ric a l, p hilological and sociological fa c t, and which transcends a narrow theological vie w p oint; the prob lem lies in the last q u a lific a tio n -th a t it must do ju stice to the understanding o f the believer. This is w hat Smart ca l led dealing w ith the m a teria l both s c ie n tific a lly and at the same time "w arm ly" (Smart 1973, p. 3) .
The re d u ctio n ist view which sees re lig io n as illuso ry in a v a rie ty o f ways, and a t the opposite extrem e the kind o f the ological sociology which in te rp re ts v irtu a lly every kind o f c iv il or social action as "religiou s" are both equally "co ld " in this respect, fo r they fa il to f u lf ill this last q ua li fic a tio n . Warmth is a sensation, a re la tio n between two things (here the observer of re lig io n and the observed) and it is the maintenance o f this w arm th which characterizes understanding, and the successful transmission o f this warm th which characterizes a good explanation, o f r e li gious data.
THE PERFECT MAN
A new idea. In the second p a rt o f this paper I want to sug gest an avenue o f approach which might open up the Bud dhist and C h ristia n tra d itio n s to a s c ie n tific , yet not re d u c tio n is t, analysis. It is however fa r easier to d iscredit old ideas than to develop new ones. Doubts about tra d itio n . W ithin both Buddhist and C hristian tra d itio n s , to a g reater or lesser exte n t according to denomiri3tion or sect, an awareness of the tension between on the one hand the tra d itio n a l teachings, and on the other hand the findings o f h isto rica l scholarship, te x t-c ritic is m and so fo rth has become a fa c t of life . W ithin C h ris tia n ity fo r instance, the problem fo r the theologians and ordinary believers lies not so much in what this kind o f research may discover as in the very p ossibility o f there being things yet to discover about C h rist and, fo r example, about early C h ris tia n ity .
We have witnessed fa irly re ce n tly the extrem e reaction in the English-speaking C hristian world to the hypothesis advanced th a t Jesus was a married man w ith a fam ily. No C h ristia n principles were d ire c tly threatened by such a hypothesis, but what was threatened once again was the very idea o f the re lia b ility o f tra d itio n . The notion was being aired th a t the C h ristia n tra d itio n may be u tte rly wrong, or a t least misinformed, about something as basic as the quest丨 on o f whether Jesus was m arried or not. (It hard ly needs to be said th a t we s till do not know w hether Jesus was m arried or not, or who he might have been m arried to, any more than we know what he looked like or what his voice sounded like .)
In contem porary 巳 uddhism too, and p a rtic u la rly in Japan, tra d itio n a l accounts of early Buddhism and the Bud dha's life have had to be revised again and again in the lig h t of new knowledge gained by scholarly investigation of Indian, Tibetan or neglected early Chinese sources. In the West, where the w eight of Buddhist tra d itio n is hardly fe lt, Buddhist scholars have been adventurous in theorizing about the origins o f Buddhism and the d iscontinuities between e a rlie r and la te r forms.
Two very recent studies, one by Graeme Macqueen on "inspired speech1 ' in early Mahayana (Macqueen 1981) and the other on the Savakasangha and the Sotapanna by Peter M a se field ,6 fo r example, support the view th a t the earliest Buddhist community which existed w hile the Buddha was alive , saw its e lf as a closed community, both in the sense th a t a u th o rita tiv e teachings had to be the word o f the Buddha himselT' and in consequence o f the fa c t tha t the transmission o f the dhamma was something tha t could only take place between the Buddha and a d iscip le .8 Mahayana 6.
"T h e S a v a k a s a n g h a and th e S o ta p a n n a " (M s . c o p y fro m th e a u th o r ). 7.
W ith m in o r e x c e p tio n s . See M a c q u e e n 1 9 8 1 , p . 309, p p . 3 1 4 -3 1 5 . 8.
" E n tr a n c e t o th e S a v a k a s a n g h a and th u s a c q u is itio n o f th is g u a ra n te e o f e n lig h te n m e n t c a m e a b o u t b y th e d i r e c t , p e rs o n a l in te r v e n t io n o f th e B
u d d h a o r , on o c c a s io n , o f h is fo r e m o s t d is c ip le s , in th e fo rm o f
an o r a l tra n s m is s io n o f th e dhamma. . . M ( M a s e fie ld ) .
Buddhism is then shown to have arisen on the basis of personal inspiration and revelation perceived to have come from the s p iritu a l form o f the Buddha, e xte rn a lly to the h is to ric a l tra d itio n a l (Macqueen 1981). Even w ith o u t these radical reassessments of early Bud dhism, which find close parallels in recent studies of early C h ris tia n ity , Buddhists and Buddhist scholars in Japan have had to come to terms w ith acknowledged flaw s, forgeries and anachronisms in the s crip tu ra l tra d itio n , successful heresies, bogus lists of patriarchs and so fo rth . W ith d e te r m ination, each successive challenge to the a u th o rity of tra d itio n can no doubt be overcome, but the tra d itio n becomes something which it has not been before when it comes under scholarly scrutiny from w ith in 丨 namely, no longer a re lia b le tra d itio n but only probably a re lia b le tra d itio n .
A ccounts and events. Perhaps debates about the re lia b ility of religious tra d itio n s belong in the nineteenth century, along w ith the various religious responses to the charge of h is to ric a l indeterm insincy， including an increased emphasis on fa ith , fee ling and religious experience as authenticators of tra d itio n .
W ithin the C hristian tra d itio n , at the level of scholarly re fle c tio n on the tra d itio n , there is now a general recogni tion of the d iffe re n ce between an event (such as the life and teaching o f Jesus) and the accounts of th a t event upon which the tra d itio n Is based. It is recognized th a t there is very lit t le evidence available upon which to reconstruct w ith any degree of c e rta in ty the personality and presence of Jesus. We now know th a t in the C hristian tra d itio n what might be called the "p o sitive " conception o f C h ris t-tha t which allows us to represent cre a tive ly in a rt, sculpture, lite ra tu re and im agination the fig ure of C h ris t-has been re-invented at every stage of the tra d itio n . R e in te rp re ta tio n o f the tra d itio n . The ways in which this re -in ve ntio n on the basis of tra d itio n goes on, and the reg u la ritie s and patterns which can be discerned in this pro cess, are w o rth y o f study in themselves, as M ichael Pye re c e n tly suggested in his discussion o f this su bject.9 Here I want only to point out one aspect o f the process o f re inte rp re ta tio n o f tra d itio n which is too re adily neglected or tre ate d negatively in com parative studies, namely the fa c t th a t understanding and explaining the tra d itio n always involves an awareness o f the distance between the present b eliever and the sig n ifica n t person or event in the past on which the b e lie ve r!s fa ith and community are founded.
In ce rtain types o f religious transmission, fo r instance in Zen 巳 uddhism, the d ire c t, a n ti-in te lle c tu a l style of teaching is form ulated precisely in order to overcome this distance between the present and the past. What is often neglected, perhaps because it is another shared blind-spot in the B uddhist-C hristian dialogue, is the significance of the fa c t th a t successive generations o f theologians and Buddhologians have been unable to agree on a re -cre a tion o f who or what C h rist was, and who or what the Buddha was, and hence e xa ctly what C h ris tia n ity or Buddhism should e n ta il.
This in a b ility is not simply the in a b ility to explain everything to everyone's s a tis fa c tio n 一the in a b ility o f a C h ristia n or Buddhist to communicate what he knows. It re fle c ts , ra th e r, a fundamental problem fo r both C hristians and Buddhists, th a t both take as th e ir object o f worship (or b e tte r, "focus" as Smart puts it) a h isto ric a l man, but a man whom they find indescribable -a p e rfe c t man.
Describing a p e rfe c t man.
A p e rfe c t man is indescribable because we do not norm ally fin d p e rfe ct men in the w orld.
.
In a d d itio n t o th e fo u r m a jo r d im e n s io n s o f a n y r e lig io u s t r a d it io n ( c o n c e p tu a l, b e h a v io r a l, s o c ia l a n d p s y c h o lo g ic a l) , P ye id e n t if ie s M a f i f t h d im e n s io n , n a m e ly th e e x te n s io n o f th e fo u r b a s ic d im e n s io n s th r o u g h tim e , w it h th e r e s u lta n t p a tte r n s a n d ro u tin e s w h ic h c a n be o b s e rv e d ru n n in g th r o u g h th e tr a d it io n s as h is t o r ic a lly k n o w n to us. I t is th is f i f t h d im e n s io n , w h ic h th e b e lie v e r v ie w s as t r a d it io n a n d w h e re th e o b s e rv e r t r ie s to p e r c e iv e p a tte r n e d d y n a m ic s , w h ic h p r o v id e s th e m a in s p r in g b o a rd in t o n e w , c r e a t iv e in t e r p r e t a t i o n s . . . . " (P y e 1979, p . ひ ).
Describing such a man as the tra d itio n s take as th e ir focus is lik e try in g to describe the smell o f an unknown flo w e r (very d iffe re n t from a flo w e r which does not exist), or i t is like try in g to imagine a coelocanth on the basis o f a few fossil remains. The Moslem poet Jalaluddin Rumi (died 1273
A.D.) in his Masnavi has a poem on "the d iffe re n ce between knowing a thing merely by sim ilitudes and on the a u th o rity o f others, and knowing the very essence th e re o f" in which he likens the believer's knowledge o f God's nature to the ch ild 's knowledge of sexual pleasure. He says: A child knows naught o f the nature o f sexual in te r course E xcept what you te ll him, th a t it is like sweetmeats. Y e t how fa r does the pleasure o f sexual intercourse R eally resemble th a t derived from sweetmeats? Nevertheless the fic tio n produces a re la tion Between you, w ith your p e rfe ct knowledge, and the child; So th a t the child knows the m a tte r by a sim ilitu de , Though he knows not its essence or actual nature. Hence if he says "I know it," 'tis not wrong. And i f he says M I know it n ot," 'tis not wrong.
(W h in fie ld a 9 7 9 , p. 154) Rumi then goes on to apply this analogy to knowledge of a p e rfe c t man, in this case the figure o f Noah in the Islamic tra d itio n :
Should one say, "Do you know Noah, That prophet o f God and luminary o f the s p irit? " I f you say, "Do I not know him, fo r th a t moon Is more famed than the sun and moon o f heaven? L ittle children in th e ir schools, And elders in th e ir mosques, A ll read his name prom inently in the Koran, And preachers te ll his story from times o f yore;" -You say tru e, fo r you know him by re p o rt, Though the real nature of Noah Is not revealed to you. On the other hand, if you say, "W hat know I o f Noah As his contemporaries knew him?
I am a poor ant -what can I know o f the elephant?… This statem ent is also tru e , 〇 brother, Seeing th a t you know not his real n atu re … (W hinfield 1979，p. 154)
Rumi says th a t this impotence to perceive real essence through second-hand knowledge is common to ordinary men, though he states th a t it is not universal. An awareness of this problem is expressed very cle a rly in both the Buddhist and the C h ristia n tra d itio n s by p erform ative acts o f hum ili ty . A p rie st ta lkin g about the Buddha or about C h rist w ith in his own community accompanies his exposition, and seeds his perform ance o f sacred ritu a ls , w ith expressions o f per sonal h u m ility tow ard the p e rfe ct man.
It is only when a Buddhist or a C hristian is asked to act as a "spokesman1 1 fo r his tra d itio n (in apologetics or in te rfa ith dialogue, or when he is evangelizing outsiders), th a t he obliged by the nature of his new ro le to pretend to understand th a t which, w ith in the community, he is happy to adm it th a t he cannot understand.
DESIRE TO MEET THE PERFECT MAN Real b ut inconceivable.
Reference to the Buddha and C h ris t as "p e rfe c t men" is not intended to set up a phenomenological type of "p e rfe c t man" and then somehow squeeze the past and present G hristian Buddhist concep tions o f th e ir founders into 丨 t -a process which would undoubtedly go against the wishes o f the m a jo rity o f each re lig io n 's believers. In fa c t we need to re tain the s p e c ifi c ity o f each; C h rist and the Buddha were, a fte r a ll, d iffe re n t individuals.
The significance of the concept of the p e rfe c t man is however th a t it emphasizes what both tra d itio n s have had in common since the death o f th e ir founders, namely an ideal (the h is to rica l fig ure o f the founder) who was both h is to ric a lly real and fundam entally inconceivable. Both C h ris t and the Buddha once walked in this w orld, and they and th e ir immediate follo w ers stand a t the beainnings o f Buddhist and C hristian h istory, but to know this as h is to r ic a l fa c t is not s u ffic ie n t fo r follow ers of e ith e r tra d itio n . Distance is not overcome by one's being aware o f it (indeed the reverse is probably the case). Hence the desire actually to encounter the Buddha or C h rist is an u ltim a te value in both tra d itio n s, so ubiquitous indeed th a t its significance is o fte n missed.
How to meet a p e rfe c t man? Because it appears impossible to go backwards in h is to ric a l tim e, C hristians and Buddhists o fte n hope to encounter the focus o f th e ir religious devo tio n 10 e ith e r a fte r this life in another w orld, or perhaps in a dream, a vision or a state o f m ystical insight where the Buddha or C h ris t is perceived to be present in sp iritu a l form . This la tte r method fo r meeting the Buddha is describ ed fo r example in the Lotus Sutra, where it is said th a t the Buddha is only apparently absent from this w orld, and th a t he can be seen and heard by anyone who has eyes to see. In other forms o f Mahayana the Buddha is said to be u lt i m ately id e n tic a l w ith one's own self, so th a t in penetrating oneself one finds the Buddha. In both Theravada and most forms of lay 巳uddhism m erit-producing a c tiv itie s , sometimes of a very mundane kind, are considered to be the means to lead an individual inexorably towards re b irth in a place and at a time when he or she can meet a Buddha.
W ithin the C hristian tra d itio n forms of m ystical devo tion are prescribed by means of which one can meet C hrist face to face, but other im portant tra d itio n s w ith in C hris tia n ity expect this m eeting to take place in the futu re , a fte r death, at the last judgement or in the second coming. "Why dost thou hide thy face?" asks St Augustine, "Happily thou w ilt say, none can see thy face and live : Ah Lord, le t me die, th a t I may see thee; le t me see thee, th a t I may B uddhism and C h ris tia n ity die. I would not live , but die. That I may see C h rist, I desire death; th a t I (G rosart 1967, p. 73) .J desire death; th a t I may live w ith C h rist, I despise life " C e n tra lity o f the p e rfe c t man. If we look at Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity in this lig h t, we can see anew how overwhelm ingly th e ir teachings, ceremonies and practices focus d ire c tly or in d ire c tly on the Buddha, or on C h rist, Remind ers of the perfesct man who once was are everywhere in images, prayers, scriptures and gestures.
O ften in Japanese Buddhist temples the presence of the Buddha is even more p o w e rfu lly expressed by being under stated, as when a Buddha-image is v irtu a lly invisible behind a screen. S im ilarly in P rotestant C h ris tia n ity the empty cross evokes pow erfu lly the memory of C h rist. The c e n tra l ity of this focusing on the p e rfe c t man is so obvious that it can easily be overlooked in com parative studies, but it is also overlooked because the concept o f a p e rfe c t man can not be s a tis fa c to rily "fille d out" or given a positive conception except by this kind of suggestiveness， or by employing the theological language of paradox and praise.
The concrete idea o f the p e rfe ct man cannot be com prehended except as an exaggeration or a myth by the social sciences.
Com parative studies which seek to be s c ie n tific have consequently been re s tric te d to viewing C h ris t and the Buddha e ith e r in terms of the subsequent tra d itio n 's changing theological view o f them, or in the a ll embracing sociological category o f "charism atic founder." To advance from this impasse, we can put forw ard a view which is both s c ie n tific a lly le g itim a te and which does jus tic e to the understanding of the believer.
A view of C h ris t and o f the Buddha as h isto rica l, but p e rfe c t men. 1 1 . Q u o te d by F r a n c is Q u a rle s (1 5 9 2 -1 6 糾 ）fro m " S .A u g u s t.S o lilo q u .c a p .I." I h a v e n o t b e e n a b le to tr a c e th is pa ssage in re c e n t tr a n s la tio n s o f A u g u s tin e 's " s o lilo q u ie s ."
Meaning o f p e rfe c t man. The idea o f the p e rfe ct man may seem a sim p listic and even re d uctio n ist approach to both C h ristia n and Buddhist teachings about C h rist and the Buddha, but if we look closely and observe the advantages o f this simple form ulation it can be seen to f u lf ill the demands o f a number o f disparate approaches to the study o f re lig io n , as w ell as providing an adequate means of distinguishing s c ie n tific and religious in te re st in the data o f religious life .
In the fir s t place, the concept o f "p e rfe c t man" is not at all a simple one. As an English term which is not used in any standard theological co nte xt it carries no special theological or Buddhological connotations, so th a t it requires fu rth e r form ulation in order to make sense. Y et all such form ulations are bound to fa il, because "p e rfe c t" and "man" are never combined in ordinary language discourse except negatively (when we describe someone as not a per fe c t man).
Y et everyone knows (in Rumi's sense of knowledge by sim ilitudes) what a p e rfe c t man would be if such a one existed -he would be a man in whom the co ntra d ictio ns th a t we ordinary people experience are removed. It is not necessary to describe such a man -indeed it is impossible to do so s a tis fa c to rily -but only to ask the individual scien tis t, scholar, fo llo w e r o f a religious teaching to consider his own im perfections annd to be aware o f them. To be aware o f what one lacks is to know in d ire c tly what com pletion or p erfe ctio n would be. It is im portant to note that this approach, although it appears to commit the e rro r laid at the door o f Schleiermacher, O tto and ce rtain phenomenologists o f requiring th a t we share in a p a rtic u la r religious experience as a prerequisite fo r understanding and in te r preting th a t experience, in fa c t does no such thing.
There is no requirem ent there to experience "the holy" or enter another's subjective understanding. A ll that is required is to be aware o f one's ordinariness. This is a very dem ocratic approach which should offend nobody. When we know what a p e rfe ct man is not, then we autom atically know what a p e rfe c t man is.
Warm th. A t this point, a s c ie n tific approach to religion which is concerned w ith C h ris tia n ity and 巳uddhism and which proceeds on the assumption tha t Jesus and the Bud dha both existed (which is no more than is a ttested by the most re lia b le h isto ric a l tra d itio n s) has to show a lit t le gen e ro sity o f s p irit and allow tha t Jesus and the Buddha were indeed p e rfe c t man. Since this is the overwhelm ing te s ti mony o f the two tra d itio n s, and the p ossibility o f the existence o f p e rfe ct men is ce rta in ly not excluded by knowledge obtained through any o f the contem porary social or human sciences, we can at least adopt this idea as a h e u ristic device and see where it leads us, by testing it against various problems encountered in the com parative study o f Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity .
R esp ectin g the b e li e v e r s understanding.
We may recall th a t one o f the firs t requirem ents o f a s c ie n tific approach to re lig io n is th a t it must do ju stice to the situ a tio n and self-understanding o f the believer. In this respect the "p e r fe c t man" paradigm is successful fo r Buddhism and C h ris tia n ity , since it puts at the center o f the analysis th a t which in each tra d itio n is in fa c t the ce n tra l (though not always the most e x p lic itly advertised) focus o f religious concern, namely the fig ure of Jesus in C h ris tia n ity and the Buddha in 巳uddhism.
Note also th a t this concept has the p o te n tia l to satisfy also the sense o f exlusiveness th a t goes, in g re ate r or les ser measure, w ith both tra d itio n s, because it says no more than tha t the Buddha and Jesus were both p e rfe ct men. The C h ristia n theological or b elieve r may want to f ill out this concept o f p e rfe ct man by saying tha t Jesus was not merely a p e rfe c t man but was also the son o f God, divine and so fo rth . This kind o f conceptual a ttrib u tiv e form ula tion remains, however, firm ly w ith in the u ch i-co n te xt and hence is necessarily accompanied by the theologian's uchico nte xt confession (which is part of his religious a ttitu d e ) th a t he has only im perfect knowledge and th a t he is like Rum i!s ant, who cannot hope to understand the elephant.
M oreover this kind o f positive conception is the sort of form u la tion tha t is perpetually being revised and augmented by developments , some of them sectarian, w ith in the tra d i tio n . The positive meaning o f this kind of form ulation w ill never be clear (and w ith in the u chi-con te xt ju s tly so, fo r the purpose of theology is not to satisfy the in te lle c t but to worship God). Theological form ulations moreover cannot deeply concern outsiders to the tra d itio n . The description of C h ris t or the Buddha as a p e rfe ct man, however, does not fa ll into this trap, being the o lo gically n eu tra l. P e rfe c t man, n ot founder. The category o f p e rfe c t man also d iffe rs s ig n ific a n tly from the idea of C h rist and the Buddha as being "founders" o f th e ir respective tra d itio n s. There can never be any h isto rica l c e rta in ty th a t C h rist or the Buddha intended to found the p a rtic u la r tra d itio n s which now bear th e ir names. The concept of p e rfe c t man allows th a t such a lin k between focus and tra d itio n may exist, but is not bound by it.
Man and myth. The concept o f a p e rfe c t man derives from the remarkable fa c t tha t certain individuals existed in par tic u la r places at p a rtic u la r times in this w orld.
It is im portant to remember tha t what is being advanced here is not a category equivalent to the "m yth" o f the p e rfe ct man, though it is true th a t what is remembered w ith in the Buddhist and C hristian tra d itio n s is tech n ica lly the myth, not the man. The point here is tha t the Buddha and C hrist did exist; the assumption is made tha t they were p erfe ct men. The im plications of the fa c t o f th e ir existence, even though in the d istan t past and in another place, is precisely what it is im portant fo r the science o f re lig io n to take account of.
The p e rfe c t man then and now. A t this point we must bor row an assumption w ith o u t which none of the human sciences would be possible at a ll-namely the assumption th a t there is a u nity o f human experience and conscious ness through tim e.
This notion o f a u n ity o f human experience is acceptable only up to a point, because it may encounter theories of the evolution o f human consciousness， but even then, in the case o f Buddhism and CThristianity which are generally considered to fa ll w ith in the same e volutionary category, being h is to ric a lly and c u ltu ra lly proxim ate and even connected, it w ill stand. From the assumption of a notional unity o f human experience -mean ing tha t human beings o f two to three thousand years ago were not substantially d iffe re n t from human beings nowwe can in fe r th a t both C h rist and the Buddha, p e rfe c t men, existed in human m ilieux not ra d ica lly d iffe re n t in terms of moral and s p iritu a l existence from our own.
From this perspective we are able to challenge socio lo g ica l and s c ie n tific re d u ctio n ist in te rp re ta tio n s o f human behaviour along the lines suggested already by Charles T a rt (1975), on the grounds tha t contemporary assumptions about human p o te n tia l and m o tiva tion are drawn from lim ited or incom plete data, or in ferre d on the basis of fa u lty reason ing. This, however, is to enter another, quite separate area o f inquiry. 
The s c ie n c e o f religion and th e so cio lo gy o f kn o w led ge.
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